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11. Public Policy for 
Reconnected Citizenship
RICHARD M. VALELLY
Intentionally or unintentionally, public policies influence 
the individual and group foundations of democratic processes and insti­
tutions. My purpose here is to explore the design of policy for recon­
nected democratic citizenship. Reconnected citizenship here means some 
shift both at the individual level and among the publics who are involved 
in making any given policy work. This shift would be toward a stronger, 
more self-conscious approval of some or all of the distinctive norms of 
democratic politics (public debate, governmental competence, rule of 
law, political equality, and social commitment to social provision of 
public goods) and, just as important, the principle that collective prob­
lems can be publicly resolved.
By changing or reinforcing links between individuals and group and 
electoral politics, policy design can alter the very context of democratic 
citizenship in which policy is made. Policy analysts, policymakers, polit­
ical activists, and citizens can—and ought—consciously to assess, much 
more often than they do now, the potential that any given policy has for 
involving citizens in democratically useful forms of group politics and 
for strengthening a sense of citizen duty. Policies that do so can enhance 
the broad governmental competence (and the public confidence in such 
competence) that is a condition for the effective political resolution of 
public problems.
Ruy Teixeira, in his study of nonvoting in American politics, calls for 
“reconnecting” American citizens to their political system. By this he 
means finding ways to foster both a better grasp of political institutions, 
processes, and issues among citizens and a significantly more positive, 
psychological affect toward the political system. Reconnected citizens, in 
his view, differ from citizens who are either indifferent toward or neutral
For valuable comments I thank Joshua Cohen, Martha Derthick, and Robert Kuttner. 
None, of course, is responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.
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about politics, are openly cynical, or have a weakened sense of citizen 
duty, that is, reject a norm of participation whatever their current eval­
uation of the political process. Over the past three decades many Amer­
icans have developed such attitudes.'
In using the term reconnected citizens, I mean more than citizens 
simply having a positive affect toward the political process. Democratic 
politics is something that everyone can be part of, at least electorally, 
and possibly more often than electorally. Without unrealistically de­
manding that everyone be a full-time political agent, my recommenda­
tions focus on making political participation more individually meaning­
ful for more Americans.
Why Reconnected Citizenship?
Two broad concerns animate these recommendations and the basic 
inquiry into the relationship between policy design and democratic citi­
zenship. The first has to do with America’s seeming increase in organized 
politics bashing (for want of a better term); the second deals with the 
fundamental utility and rewards of democratic political community.
First is politics bashing. Fostering reconnected citizenship may consti­
tute, I believe, a needed response to increased public discontent with 
politics. In 1992, fourteen states approved term limitations for members 
of Congress. The idea of an explicit constitutional rule for curbing defi­
cits, espoused by Presidents Reagan and Bush, has also become increas­
ingly popular, on the ground that ordinary legislative politics has no 
internal fiscal balance. Consider, too, some of the Perot movement’s 
significance. In launching and then relaunching his candidacy, Ross Perot 
and those associated with him frankly espoused new mechanisms of 
accountability and representation that would supposedly solve not just 
the “mess” in Congress but the whole mess in Washington. These ideas 
include electronic town meetings, mass canvassing of the public mood 
via instant electronic referenda, and service in the presidency without 
pay. The Perot campaign articulated a fairly widespread desire for a 
special government above ordinary politics.
Such public discontent undoubtedly performs useful corrective func­
tions in American politics. It reflects public concern over very real features 
of contemporary American politics and holds open the promises of more
I. Teixeira (1992, chap. 2). The term reconnected can be found on pp. 154—55; fc 
reform proposals giving a flavor of Teixeira’s view of reconnectedness, see pp. 156—82.
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collective dialogue and political accountability.^ But collective problems 
cannot actually be addressed if there is no public patience with ordinary 
democratic government and politics. Politics ought not to be a dirty word 
or connote that the dominant reality of American politics is a giant rent- 
seeking scam run by the organized at the expense of the unorganized.
Effective policymaking—the public and efficient provision of public 
goods—requires tolerance of the characteristic limits of the policy pro­
cess, not a desire for “big fixes,” such as new constitutional rules or 
plebiscitary presidencies. Effective policies require feedback, assessment, 
and modification when warranted; such feedback, assessment, and re­
casting depend on public patience; and public patience ultimately comes 
from public loyalty to and confidence in ordinary political and policy­
making processes. Policy initiatives in the 1990s, when the public has 
become aware of a series of social, environmental, and economic prob­
lems, demand a sturdier foundation than impatient discontent.
American politics is now haunted by the specter of inflated expecta­
tions and mass disappointments with broad policy initiatives to correct 
such widely perceived problems as the health insurance crisis. A subtle 
harm to constitutionalism and, ultimately, to political democracy, to say 
nothing of the prospects for really solving public problems, might result 
from the organized politics bashing that is now a real and growing force.^
Careful attention to how policy can generate reconnected citizenship 
may therefore be a way of avoiding such dangers. There are other ways, 
of course, such as revitalizing local government. But national policy gets 
made regularly; every day large numbers of creative people are thinking 
about setting the national policy agenda, shaping the policy process, 
influencing implementation, and working to fight future battles over pol­
icy. Analyzing how artfully to redirect this ongoing policy process may 
help to change the rage, discontent, or simple apathy with and about 
government and politics that many Americans feel. Success in doing this, 
in turn, might well strengthen the social foundation of public approaches 
to common problems.
Public policy for reconnected citizenship has a second and separate 
justification. In an important sense, fostering reconnected citizenship
2. Jeffrey Schmalz, “Americans Sign Up In Record Numbers To Cast A Ballot,” New 
York Times, October 19, 1992, p. Ai, provides anecdotal evidence of the Perot campaign’s 
impact on citizen awareness of issues.
3. See, for instance, President Clinton’s May 14, 1993, press conference. An interesting 
report in this connection is Dennis Farney, “Bedroom Communities Want Clinton to Solve 
Their Problems, Too,” Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1993, p. Ai.
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would help to lay the “seed corn,” so to speak, of political community 
and of the arts and skills of political cooperation and mutual political 
association (hereafter referred to as associationalism). These arts and 
skills help democratic polities avoid fratricidal conflict, suboptimal social 
and economic development, and social tendencies to authoritarianism or 
leader worship/
Through its ordinary processes democratic politics often seems to 
continually reinvigorate these arts and skills. Recent theorizing about the 
relationship between individuals and collective institutions and processes 
has come to appreciate that preferences and behavior shift as individuals 
cross boundaries between marketlike areas of life and communal and 
political areas of life. Voting, for instance, becomes paradoxical and 
irrational in strictly egoistic terms, hence the recognition in political 
science of the role of a sense of duty. More basically, different domains 
exist and people recognize this as they shift back and forth between 
them.^
But even if people adjust as they shift between the market and the 
public square,” suggesting a stable coexistence of domains, association­
alism and the norms supporting it require nurturance, given what is 
known about the difficulty of collective action. Self-interest and egoism 
are powerful forces; at some point one domain might colonize or conquer 
the other. In the 1970s it was widely feared that politics had killed the 
market, but the opposite fear—that self-interest more often than not 
blocks cooperation for the supply of public goods—is equally plausible. 
Self-interest and egoism can and do play positive roles. As an example, 
some approaches to environmental regulation recommend establishing 
markets in pollutants that would adequately price the negative external­
ities of production and thus rapidly accelerate progress toward meeting 
environmental standards. But self-interest and egoism, or simple indif­
ference toward politics, can gradually corrupt a community’s capacity to 
address its problems. In a society as powerfully individualistic as Amer­
ican society, it is almost impossible to “overnurture” associationalism 
and public-regarding norms.* We may well constantly run, as a society,
4. For a recent statement, see Putnam (1993) generalizing from Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti (1993).
5. See Hirschman (1982) and Kelman (1987, especially chaps. lo-ii). For more ana­
lytic treatments, see Margolis (1982), and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). 1 thank Janice 
Fine of the MIT Political Science Department for reminding me of the basic links between 
the less analytic and more analytic works cited here.
6. This was Tocqueville’s basic point in Democracy in America.
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an associational deficit. Public policy for reconnected citizenship would 
help to lay “seed corn” for a stock of socially valuable skills and behav­
iors perhaps continually in danger of depletion. Public policy for recon­
nected citizenship has not only a short-run justification—balancing the 
potential dangers of contemporary politics bashing; it also has a long- 
run justification—contributing to the diffusion of norms and skills that 
any democratic polity needs.
Policy Messages and Citizen Status
My approach to analyzing policy for reconnected citizenship borrows 
from the work of other authors in this volume: Helen Ingram and Anne 
Schneider’s work on, as they aptly put it, “the subtle messages of policy 
design,” Deborah Stone’s account of the role that “causal stories” play 
in policy processes, and Janet Weiss’s work on public information cam­
paigns.^ Public policies can contain several kinds of messages about pub­
lic purposes and citizens’ role in their realization. First, they can send 
signals about the people who are involved in making the policy work— 
what Ingram and Schneider have called the “target populations” of a 
given policy, that is, the specification of “who is to do what, how, and 
for what reason.” In selecting target populations, further, a policy and 
its design implicitly tell a “story” about both the problem or problems 
that the policy is meant to address and the causal role of the target 
populations in solving that problem.
For instance, in a case discussed further below, a policy encouraging 
European-style works councils within industrial firms would signal that 
one of the causes of a public problem, uncertain or possibly declining 
industrial competitiveness, is how firms use the problem-solving skills of 
their work forces—and therefore would also signal a less well-recognized 
problem, namely, poor standards for workplace relations. Therefore, to 
realize a common national goal—increased competitiveness—workers 
become a “target population” conceived of as agents of a public solution 
to the problem of uncertain competitiveness. Their very agency also ad­
dresses a related problem—poor standards for workplace relations be­
tween workers and management.
This is an illustration of a policy whose design would signal to its 
target population the public recognition of a public problem, shared by 
many Americans; it thus “constructs” a target population as the agent
7. Chapters 4 and 5 in this volume and Stone (1989).
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of a common purpose, through participation and representation, in local, 
workplace problem-solving processes. Not only does such a policy design 
help place people in valued problem-solving roles, but it also underscores 
that public goals are realizable.
Policy design can thus signal to citizens that effective government is 
possible and it involves ordinary people. Key conditions of democratic 
political order—competent government and political accountability—are 
reinforced. Strengthening these conditions reinforces another democratic 
norm—deliberation. Political deliberation, whether in legislatures or in 
carpools, means little if government is ineffective or unaccountable. But 
deliberation means much more if the prospect of effective government is 
genuine. Policy for reconnected citizenship, in other words, involves or­
dinary citizens in publicly constituted processes that address real prob­
lems and also strengthens their stake in democratic politics.
These points are suggested through illustration. After treating general 
issues in democratic theory, a case study of the “employment involve­
ment” trend in industrial relations considers how to redirect an existing 
trend in a democratically desirable direction. Next a case study of an 
environmental policy seeks to uncover the democratic value of an existing 
policy. Finally, a case study of legislation to improve voter turnout seeks 
to show what a policy proposal already on the legislative agenda may 
well need in order to maximize its intended democratic goal. The first 
two cases are about designing associationalism; the last treats how to 
clarify for citizens some of what is involved in electoral choice.
Recasting Associationalism
One of the key things that public policy for reconnected citizenship 
can do is affect the group system. But how easy is citizen involvement in 
group politics? And what does democratic theory say about the desira­
bility of group politics? Without addressing these questions, seeking to 
influence associationalism in the name of reconnected citizenship might 
seem either pointless or, worse, factional.
The Relative Ease of Associationalism
Early pluralist theorists, such as David Truman, emphasized how 
quickly groups arose, and they underscored the inherently inclusionary 
character of the group system, picturing it as an arena for broad repre-
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sentation of a wide variety of interests and values. This view suggests 
that associationalism comes easily to citizens. Such a seemingly Panglos- 
sian view of the group system came under several kinds of attack, ranging 
from Mancur Olson’s formal and logical demonstration of both the dif­
ficulty of collective action and the strength of the microeconomic incen­
tives to avoid associational activity, to arguments emphasizing the highly 
uneven distribution of resources necessary for competition for public 
resources within the group system. In E. E. Schattschneider’s famous 
phrase, “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings 
with a strong upper-class accent.” The cumulative force of these attacks 
apparently required very substantial modification of early views of group 
politics.*
In recent work, however. Jack Walker went far toward showing that 
the group system is as dynamic in its evolution as early pluralists sug­
gested, although for reasons far different from those initially emphasized. 
Walker constructed the first reliable “census” of interest groups across 
time. He found that the older view of “stable unrepresentation” (due to 
scarce distribution of political resources) no longer captures interest 
group politics.'’ At any point in time in a democratic system political 
resources do have a highly skewed, underlying distribution consistent 
with the socioeconomic inequalities of a capitalist society. The underlying 
scarcity of resources for effective group politics—time, skills, and money 
— appears to erect a high “threshold” for associational activity. But 
Walker considered the variety and scope of government’s regulatory and 
policy initiatives, as well as the array of private institutions and actors, 
including government, foundations, and the media, dedicated to solving 
policy problems and to diffusing information about policy issues.
Actors in public and private institutions are constantly, if often unin­
tentionally, rearranging the group system, for instance, by changing the 
structure of opportunities for organization, by providing valuable re­
sources, or simply by deepening lines of conflict. For example, when the 
Kennedy administration established state-level commissions on the status 
of women, it laid the basis for the formation of the National Organization 
of Women. Similarly, liberal foundations helped to finance the black 
voter registration drive of the early 1960s in the deep South. This accel­
erated social change but also intensified factionalism within the civil 
rights movement. Injection of resources and change in political oppor-
8. Truman (1951); Olson (1965); and Schattschneider (1975).
9. Walker (1988); and Gamson (1968).
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tunities thus regularly restructure patterns of collective action. An im­
portant aggregate, unintended consequence has been that—with the 
exception of the long decline of organized labor—gaps in group repre­
sentation have closed steadily since the 1930s. In short, the group system 
is dynamic, shifting, and relatively open—not unchanging and closed to 
newcomers. While associationalism hardly comes as easily to citizens as 
pluralist theorists first claimed, it comes more easily than the reactions 
to pluralism suggested.’®
The Relative Desirability of Associationalism
But is a trend toward increased associationalism desirable? If not, why 
reinforce it or further stimulate it? From at least two perspectives in­
creased associationalism could easily seem questionable. The first is neo­
classical liberal theory, which considers the collapse of the separation 
between market and state that is embedded in the interventionist, welfare 
state a central feature of modern politics. It has generated innumerable 
forms of government-conferred privilege for producer and social 
groups—farmers, workers, industrial sectors, the aged, and those in need 
of low-cost housing. The development of the social standards that are 
demanded by these groups simply piles up labor costs, causing capital to 
move toward lower-cost countries, and menaces the fiscal balance re­
quired for providing truly essential public goods.”
From a more neo-Madisonian political perspective, there is wide­
spread evidence of the mischiefs of faction. To whatever degree the group 
system is more dynamic than once thought, there still is a threshold of 
entry. Groups consequently have an advantage over ordinary citizens in 
shaping the political agenda. “Overrepresented” minorities thus generate 
governmental goods for their private benefit and spread the costs to the 
unorganized majority. “Pork” may be generated, agencies may be “cap­
tured,” agenda-setting in specific policy domains may be ceded to orga­
nized groups, and, through the political economy of campaign finance, 
the integrity of legislators and legislative processes compromised. Groups 
may exploit either citizen activism or legitimate citizen concerns while 
actually operating as little more than sophisticated, direct mail operations 
with high overhead. Or, if they influence presidential nominating rules
10. Walker (1988); see also Walker (1991).
11. For thinking about objections to associationalism 1 found Cohen and Rogers (1991) 
very useful.
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of the major parties in their favor, they may undermine the capacities of 
parties to offer majoritarian policy platforms.'^
The total results of such rent seeking and faction not only threaten the 
norm of equity in access to public privileges and in the incidence of public 
burdens (as in the case of spreading the costs of narrow benefits), but 
also threaten the foundations of governmental competence (as in the case 
of “pork” or agency capture). Yet the prospects both of equity and of 
governmental competence are fundamental conditions of a democratic 
order. Without them, public debate about public purposes would become 
trivial. Thus groups seem constantly to threaten a democratic order.“
But democratic theory does not speak with one voice about groups 
and associationalism. It also holds that groups and associations can be 
“schools of democracy.” Associationalism builds a certain kind of civic 
virtue. As John Stuart Mill argued, participation is educative: a person 
has to “weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in the case of conflicting 
claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every 
turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the 
common good.”’"*
A distinction that Tocqueville drew between “self interest well under­
stood” and “individualism” is also helpful here. Tocqueville, in Democ­
racy in America, pondered the character of the political virtue that de­
mocracy requires of its citizens. He suggested that “self interest well 
understood” was a form of dem.ocratic virtue strong enough to sustain a 
widely held ethic of caring, to some degree, about public concerns. He 
contrasted this with an antipolitical attitude, “individualism,” and wor­
ried about the disconnection from politics and from the associationalism 
of democratic politics that is implied by “individualism.” Associational­
ism, in his view, nurtured self-interest well understood.'^
Second, associations can empower and encourage those who can easily 
become discouraged and disfranchised: landless farmworkers, the dis­
abled and handicapped, veterans of an unpopular war, women discrim­
inated against in the workplace and in courtrooms, and ordinary, hard­
working blue-collar men and women. Despite formal political equality,
12. An especially striking example of several of these problems can be found in Erik 
Eckholm, “Alarmed by Fund Raiser, The Elderly Give Millions,” New York Times, Novem­
ber 12, 1992, p. Ai, which describes Richard Viguerie’s activities in direct mail fundraising 
for groups supposedly monitoring social security policy for the elderly. See also Hansen 
(1991); Hirschman (1970, chap. 6); Moe (1989); and Polsby (1983).
13. McConnell (1966); Hansen (1991); Page (1983); and Romer and Weingast (1991).
14. Pateman (1970, p. 30).
15. Tocqueville (1969, pp. 506-28).
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their “voices,” even if articulated, are often indistinct or inaudible to “the 
mainstream.”
Electoral politics, especially presidential electoral politics, would seem 
to correct for “deaf democracy.” Voting is not a costly activity: everyone 
one can do it, the handicapped and the healthy, men and women, rich 
and poor. Also, the presidential constituency is national. Presidents tend 
to care about the macroeconomy, national strength, and such broad 
issues as strengthening self-reliance, equality, inclusion, and some mea­
sure of social justice. Hence the interest in responsible parties and activist 
presidencies found among such critics of pluralism as E. E. Schattschnei- 
der and Grant McConnell and their legatees in American political science. 
And, broadly speaking, as Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen 
show, strong party politics, which involves mobilization of the electorate, 
tends to reduce class bias in representation.'®
But electoral politics can also be subtly unrepresentative. It tends to­
ward the aggregation of interests, toward broadest common denomina­
tors. And mandates are notoriously found in the eyes of the beholders. 
Electoral outcomes provide very imprecise signals to policymakers; the 
information they convey is always mediated by the policy activists, poll­
sters, and political professionals within and without major campaign 
organizations. The articulation of interests and “voicing” of group poli­
tics, particularly protest groups, make up for such intricate exclusion, 
removing ambiguity and doubt about interests and needs, and, in so 
doing, betokening inclusion and equity. Strong party and electoral poli­
tics are perhaps most representative, therefore, when there is also a strong 
group system.'^
If, therefore, democratic theory delivers conflicting judgments about 
groups and associationalism—finding democratic education and honor­
able representation in group politics as much as it finds faction—then 
ruling for one or another view obviously becomes an empirical and pru­
dential matter. The proof of associationalism is in the political pudding, 
as it were. Sometimes democratic education and inclusive representation 
ensue; other times, faction prevails. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers have 
advised, accordingly, a deliberate politics of association. Using standard 
policy tools, they mean to recast group politics so that its processes 
converge simultaneously on democratic education, more inclusive rep-
16. Schattschneider (1975); McConnell (1966); and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993).
17. Schlozman and Verba (1987).
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resentation, and more effective policy. The basic idea here is that groups 
have an unrecognized function to perform in tailoring policy initiatives 
to local circumstances. In a wide variety of settings they can help ordinary 
people to act as the experts “on the ground.” Such policy design can, 
indeed, add to governmental competence.'*
To exemplify this recommendation, I will focus on industrial relations 
and on an emerging form of representation in environmental regulation.
Recasting Representation in Industrial Relations
By now it is commonplace to hear a summons for public policy to 
encourage workplace democracy. Such calls occur in a context in which 
it is widely (although hardly universally) assumed that labor has rights, 
that is, that industrial democracy, in principle, is socially valuable. But 
key issues now are international economic competitiveness, particularly 
concerning newly industrializing countries, such as Korea or Taiwan, 
and seemingly well organized social systems of production, such as Ja­
pan’s or Germany’s, and increasing international wage competition. Thus 
calls for employee involvement (or El) typically recognize that, given this 
new context, the social standards for protecting a measure of industrial 
democracy need to be recast.
Indeed, public policy already seemingly encourages workplace democ­
racy and many private initiatives appear to institute it. The tax code 
currently encourages employee stock ownership plans; by the late 1980s 
several thousand firms, covering millions of employees, had some kind 
of employee ownership, and several hundred of these were majority- 
owned. In addition, several national agencies have responsibilities for 
“facilitating the formation of worker cooperatives and worker buy­
outs.”^® During much of the 1980s the U.S. Department of Labor assisted 
in the creation of more participatory workplace systems.
In the private sector, corporate experimentation with worker partici­
pation has been very widespread, partly out of competitive necessity 
(also, in part, to shed or to deter unionization). In the 1980s corporate 
America was a prime agent of experimentation in new organizational 
structures and more flexibility in the workplace. Some form of employee 
participation had come to between one-third and one-half of U.S. firms
18. Cohen and Rogers (1991, p. 4x5).
19. The best short discussion, scholarly or popular, is Metzgar (199Z).
20. Bachrach and Botwinick (1992, pp. 104-05). See also Rosen (1991).
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by the mid-1980s. Larger firms may have adopted it more willingly than 
smaller firms.^*
The effect of these changes on efficiency is as yet unclear, although the 
cumulative evidence regarding the few genuine cases of El suggests real 
gains. More relevant to my purpose here, there has been very little dis­
cussion of the political consequences.
The effect on citizenship of increased public and private investment in 
El appears to have been, at best, slight. Worker-owned and worker- 
managed companies do tend to reinforce voting in national and local 
elections. Workers in such companies also seem a bit more likely to 
encourage friends or neighbors to vote, to contact public officials about 
an issue, to write letters to editors, to work with others to solve some 
community problem, to attend meetings of the city or town council, and 
to attend a public hearing of a government agency, such as a school 
board.
The meager political effect of the extensive experimentation with El 
is surely explained to some extent by its largely cosmetic character. Over­
all, the 1980s were marked more by harsher employer treatment of 
unions and by less focus on employee job security, pension rights, and 
fringe benefits than by consensual establishment of workplace democ­
racy. If the experimentation had led to fundamental changes in workplace 
hierarchies, then it is much less likely that one would have seen in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s both a rash of corporate efforts to replace 
striking workers permanently and widespread “downsizing” and “reen­
gineering” of work forces. Only a handful of corporations witnessed 
signficant efforts at genuine reform: the Saturn division of General Mo­
tors, Xerox, Ford Motor Company, and a few others. Others, such as 
Eastern Airlines and Caterpillar, saw new management teams disman­
tling successful El systems, with, at best, dubious gains.
zi. Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Verman (1991); Heckscher (1991); Kochan and 
McKersie (1990); and Bachrach and Botwinick (1992, p. 102).
22. See Greenberg {1986, chap. 5). Greenberg reviews the scant positive, empirical 
literature on the subject of workplace democracy’s political effects at pp. 119 and 123. 
Greenberg cautions that certain forms of workplace democracy, in particular worker- 
owned cooperatives, tend to make workers, quite rationally, given the market challenges 
such co-ops face, more aggressively self-interested.
23. See Kelley and Harrison (1992) and Harrison (1991, p. 74). On the state of labor 
relations, see Hoerr (1992). On Xerox, see Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991), the result of doc­
toral work at the MIT Sloan School of Management. Saul Rubenstein, of the Sloan Ph.D. 
program in industrial relations, is currently preparing a similar study of Saturn. For Ford
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Clearly, therefore, there is room for public policy, in particular policy 
that tends to institute the kind of genuine reform that currently exists in 
only a few firm-level oases in the American workplace economy. The 
Commission for the Future of Worker-Management Relations appointed 
by Secretary of Labor Robert Reich suggests that the 1990s may see some 
push for revitalized industrial relations.^'* A promising proposal would 
tie the reform of pension laws or tax expenditure benefits to establish­
ment of employee participation committees (EPCs) in firms larger than 
twenty-five employees. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, and 
its statutory and administrative amendments, are implicitly seen in this 
proposal as somewhat limited, although by no means obsolete. Along 
with basic unionism new forms of workplace representation may be 
necessary. These would build on recognition of the multiple ways in 
which industrial representation has grown up outside the administrative 
framework established by the NLRA, for instance, in the federal courts, 
which now increasingly govern a variety of workplace issues (for exam­
ple, women’s reproductive rights, workplace safety, and pension benefits 
of bankrupt companies).
EPC members would be rank-and-file employees elected by their co­
workers through secret ballots. EPCs would consider not only wages, 
benefits, hiring, and training, but product and process innovation and 
the introduction of “best industry practice” technology. Finally, they 
would administer federal workplace safety programs in ways that would 
eliminate the need for the inspectorates that business has found so med­
dlesome.
A key feature of the EPC idea is that it be autonomously funded 
through joint worker and firm contributions. In other words, in return 
for tax credits or other incentives, firms would be required to partly fund 
EPCs. This funding would help EPCs secure expert assistance and advice 
from unions, consulting firms, academics, and other EPCs. To the extent 
that this incorporation of expertise generated firm-level allocative effi-
Motor Company, see Neal Templin, “A Decisive Response to Crisis Brought Ford Enhanced 
Productivity,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1992, p. Ai. On “re-engineering,” see Al 
Ehrbar, “ ‘Re-Engineering’ Gives Firms New Efficiency, Workers the Pink Slip,” Wall Street 
Journal, March 16, 1993, p. At. For an equally chilling glimpse at the corporate shedding 
of labor, see Joann S. Lublin, “Ranks of Unemployed Couples Multiply, Devastating Dou­
ble-Income Flouseholds,” Wall Street Journal, May 7, 1993, p. Bi.
24. For examples of the debate inspired by the commission’s establishment, see Es- 
treicher {1993); Rothstein (1993); and Stone (1993). See also Cohen and Rogers (1992, 
pp. 455-58)-
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ciencies, incentives for passing the cost of funding EPCs on to consumers 
would diminish.^^
Genuine, robust codetermination, which probably means also helping 
autonomous unionism to reemerge in many workplaces, would also have 
two political dimensions that firms might accept because of the promise 
of internal efficiencies. These are restoring or substantively implementing 
protective rights that have not been vigorously enforced in the past dec­
ade, such as rights to a safe work environment, and, second, the devel­
opment of new participation rights in the form of significant worker 
participation in decisions historically considered to be management pre­
rogatives.^* Change along these two dimensions would surely be conten­
tious. One of the fundamental origins of the Caterpillar strike of 1991- 
92, for instance, was management opposition to growing union involve­
ment in historic management prerogatives. But workplace democracy 
may well possess key economic strengths: flexibility in responding to 
market change and higher product quality. It was precisely along these 
dimensions that Japanese companies mounted their most effective chal­
lenge to firms in other countries in the past two decades.^^ Obviously, 
the prospect of reaping efficiencies might well constitute insufficient in­
ducement in a corporate culture that has nurtured only superficial 
changes in workplace relations and that credits recent success in export 
competitiveness to cost cutting through shedding labor or forcing down 
the wage bill. But many Americans may be genuinely interested in eco­
nomic democracy.^*
EPCs might help to restore confidence among much of the industrial 
work force that setting social standards, such as protective rights in the 
workplace, is not an exercise in futility. The confidence of industrial 
management in broad social standards may be increased, and managers
25. For more on EPCs see Weiler (1990).
26. Bachrach and Botwinick (1992, chap. 9) and Metzgar (199^)-
27. Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991) details some of the efficiency advantages. Womack, 
Jones, and Roos (1990) detail the firm-level characteristics of Japanese industrial compet­
itiveness in a leading economic sector, auto-industrial manufacturing.
28. A 1975 survey found that 65 percent would favor working for a company that is 
employee owned and controlled; 52 percent would support a plan “in which employees 
determine broad company policy”; and 66 percent said they did not work as hard as they 
could “because they aren’t given enough say in decisions which affect their jobs.” Christie 
(1984, p. 125). The survey is obviously dated, and 1 am not aware of more recent data, 
but we now have a better sense that public opinion is surprisingly stable. See Page and 
Shapiro (1992, chaps. 1-2). Still, a repeated survey would be required before drawing any 
satisfying inference.
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might see that such standards need not be overbroad or burdensome but 
can be adjusted to local needs in light of local knowledge and capacities.
A possible second-order effect of reformed workplace relations is the 
construction of a certain context for reconnected citizenship. A public 
policy encouraging the establishment of EPCs implicitly treats those par­
ticipants in EPC formation and maintenance as competent; able to man­
age the overlaps between workers’ interests and management interests in 
productivity, flexibility, and workplace safety and judge the need for new 
rights. It is a policy that tends to “construct” people in a certain way.
In doing this, a policy encouraging workplace democracy that is much 
more genuine than has so far appeared with most employee involvement 
programs of the 1980s establishes nationally sanctioned patterns of 
small-scale governance. Such national encouragement of small-scale 
forms of governance might well reinforce citizenship for large-scale gov­
ernance. Involvement in making truly consequential decisions at the local 
level in a publicly designed and publicly evaluated process may invite 
other forms of associationalism beyond the workplace, and it may be­
token a strengthened capacity of individuals for involvement in other 
processes of consequential decisionmaking. It may promote reconnected 
citizenship even as a specific policy issue is addressed in ways that meet 
the interests of the various actors in, or concerned about, the policy 
domain. A second, similar example follows.
Recasting Representation in 
Environmental Regulation
Environmental regulation today explicitly provides for group repre­
sentation, such as public comment on rulemaking. Yet such group 
representation is subject to the criticism that it impedes effective deci­
sionmaking, partly explaining, in turn, a notorious delay in achieving 
environmental goals. Putting regulation together with a key feature of 
democracy, group representation, seems to be a recipe for the frustration 
of public goals and the undermining of governmental competence in this 
particular policy area.
One example, however, the 1986 Emergency Planning and Commu­
nity Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), seems to provide evidence for a 
different and hopeful view of the relationships between groups and reg­
ulation. Certain of its characteristics have the potential to improve en­
vironmental standards while arguably revitalizing civic consciousness in 
local communities around the country.
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In 1986, in response to the disaster at the Union Carbide facility in 
Bhopal, India, Congress passed EPCRA as Title III of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, modeling it in part on 
an earlier New Jersey right-to-know statute. EPCRA requires the Envi­
ronmental Protection Agency to release what is known as the Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI), which lists the quantity of 320 carcinogens 
released by industrial plants across the country.^’ The TRI, in principle, 
provides information on what a factory is emitting, how much, and into 
what medium (land, water, or air) and what chemicals are currently 
stored and whether there is a record of spillage.
In fact, TRI is unknown to the general public, even in areas where 
general community concern about toxic emissions is known to exist, is 
woefully incomplete due both to its flawed, data-gathering mandate and 
imperfect corporate compliance, and has few internal, systematic checks 
on the reliability of the data it reports. While EPA has made improve­
ments to how the information in TRI is released, via on-line database, 
CD-ROM, fiche, and other media, obtaining the information is prohibi­
tively expensive for an ordinary citizen. Corporations, indeed, purchase 
most of the TRI data for their own use. Finally, there is some fragmentary 
evidence that TRI encourages corporations in compliance with the EPA 
reporting program to juggle their data in order to appear as if they are 
reducing emissions at a greater rate than they actually are.
Nevertheless, TRI has spurred citizen protest, involvement by state 
environmental regulators, state legislative activity, and very strong vol­
untary compliance among leading companies, principally the Monsanto 
Corporation, to meet locally set targets for reduction of emissions. Much 
of the transmission of its information occurs through the existing system 
of environmental advocacy groups. The process is in line with the revised 
view of the group system’s developmental dynamics, which states that 
associationalism, while not easy, is certainly easier than the critics of 
pluralism in the 1960s and 1970s suggested, and that governmental pro­
vision of a resource crucial for collective action (in this case, information 
that would otherwise be impossible or irrationally time-consuming for 
any given group, not to mention the ordinary citizen, to obtain) is a key 
stimulus to associationalism.
Environmental advocacy groups computerize and process the dense 
information in the TRI, circulating their reformatting of the data, which
29. My treatment of this statute is based on Shenkman (1990); Randolph B. Smith, “A 
U.S. Report Spurs Community Action By Revealing Polluters,” Wall Street Journal, January 
2, 1991, p. At; and General Accounting Office (1991).
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are then picked up by local media or local activists. Although the evidence 
so far is fragmentary, it does seem that this mechanism has triggered the 
ad hoc formation of local citizen groups, which then work with local 
companies, state regulators, and, when companies are unionized, a 
plant’s unions.
Local dynamics are hardly free of conflict, can create tensions, and are 
marked by sometimes irate citizen protest. Managers in many companies 
evidently believe that the information in the TRI can be and has been put 
to misleading uses. But the bottom line seems to be genuine progress, in 
several communities, on first developing and then implementing local 
environmental standards.
A striking feature of EPCRA’s politics is the policy’s implicit evalua­
tion of citizen capacities to understand a scientifically complex issue, in 
this case the level of acceptable risk to a community due to toxic emis­
sions from a local plant. It assumes that citizens should be able to control 
politically the level and kind of toxic emissions occurring in their com­
munities. For some, this optimistic evaluation of citizen capacities may 
seem mistaken. Scientific literacy is not widespread in the United States, 
and it is widely believed among the technologically and scientifically 
literate that citizen incompetence probably precludes citizen involvement 
in key regulatory issues.
Yet the threshold for effective citizen involvement may not be very 
high at all in the sense that ordinary citizens may be able to make rea­
sonable choices after only brief exposure to thinking about complex 
issues. A recent study paired roughly equal, randomly selected samples 
of ordinary citizens and scientists, for whom uncertainty, probability, 
and hypothesis are familiar concepts even though they were not experts 
in the issues treated by the study. The study exposed the citizen sample 
to a questionnaire, a twenty-minute film, and forty-five-minute group 
discussions of complex policy issues led by moderators, followed (at a 
second, later session) by another brief film recapitulating issues treated 
in the earlier session and a readministration of the questionnaire. It found 
that for the most part both samples, layman and scientist, considered the 
same policy issues similarly. These included solid waste disposal and 
reducing the threat of global warming from carbon dioxide emissions 
due to coal and gasoline consumption in home heating and transporta­
tion. The differences that did exist between the two groups seemed plau­
sibly related to factors other than scientific literacy. The study hardly 
settles the wisdom or illogic of citizen involvement in scientifically or 
technologically complex policy issues. But it does suggest that renewal
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of the system of representation may not have to be restricted to certain 
kinds of issues deemed “suitable” for the average citizen.^®
EPCRA’s potential for reconnected citizenship is striking for the ab­
sence of an inspectorate intervening in local circumstances. A common 
complaint about bureaucracies is that they impose broad standards but 
are unable to customize these broad standards, so to speak, to account 
for local circumstances. This is not meant to argue against bureaucracies 
or standards. The TRI obviously could not exist without bureaucratic 
collection of the information that goes into the inventory and efforts to 
enforce corporate compliance with reporting. Relatedly, the capacity of 
citizen groups in a given locale to have articulate demands at all about 
permissible standards clearly depends in part on an earlier, national his­
tory of a public search for broad environmental standards. Mentioning 
the common complaint about bureaucratic incapacity to take account of 
local conditions is meant only to underscore a feature of contemporary 
regulation that can and does generate a certain amount of public cyni­
cism, both about governmental competence and, more generally, about 
the very possibility of effective regulation. EPCRA thus seems to have a 
potential for encouraging public confidence in the public purpose of en­
vironmental regulation. If so, that points toward reconnected citizenship.
A second and related feature of EPCRA’s politics is the implicit em­
phasis on small-scale governance. The design of this policy constructs a 
target population in such a way as to endow it with competence to 
address responsibly a public problem about which there is widespread 
concern, namely, the release of toxic chemicals. The design of the policy 
further assumes that a key cause of the problem is public ignorance about 
such release and that, therefore, a key remedy must be government pro­
vision to citizens of the information they need. Small-scale governance 
not only involves people in solving a problem that many actors in the 
policy domain, for different reasons, have an interest in solving; it also 
has a tendency to lay the “seed corn” of reconnected citizenship. To the 
extent that people govern on a small scale, the possibilities grow for the 
transfer of skills engendered in one area to another, small-scale context, 
or to involvement in electoral politics and in the associational life of 
groups or movements with national goals.
In considering how policy design can recast associationalism, I have 
stressed that such design has the potential to “construct” citizens as 
participants in local forms of representation—in the workplace and in
30. Doble and Richardson {1992).
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communities—that in turn effectively address widely recognized public 
problems. But for several reasons a discussion of policy design for recon­
nected citizenship must also explore whether and how policy can influ­
ence a revitalization of the electoral process.
First, for those who are part of the stronger group politics that is 
envisioned here, group politics might well be perceived—by some frac­
tion of them—as oriented toward broad goals if electoral politics is also 
seen as meaningful and valuable. Second, some fraction of those who are 
not now involved in group politics may become more interested if elec­
toral politics is perceived as more vital. The two domains, group and 
electoral, may renew each other. Associationalism ought to be seen as a 
continuum, and policy for reconnected citizenship ought—and can— 
attend to reconnecting all along this continuum.
Recasting Voter Registration:
The Role of Public Information
As is well known, voter turnout in U.S. presidential elections (defined 
as the ratio of actual to eligible voters) dropped about 13 points between 
i960 and 1988, and it dropped in other national elections as well. To be 
sure, the 1992 presidential election seems to have reversed the trend 
noticeably, but given the amount of measurement error in estimates pro­
duced on or right after election day, and given the weight and variety of 
social and political forces that appear to have produced the decline, it 
will not be clear whether there really was a significant reversal until well 
into 1993, and, in any event, far from clear that it can stand as a lasting 
reversal.^’
Nonvoting, indeed, is pervasive in American electoral politics. Minor­
ities of active voters determine the outcomes of gubernatorial, state leg­
islative, county, mayoral, and municipal council elections, as well as state 
and local referenda. While there are exceptions, the rule seems to be that 
the smaller the constituency, the smaller the active voting public.^^
The question of whether and how to reverse decline in just one cate­
gory of electoral activity, national elections, proves to be a genuinely 
complex matter. Any resolution of it depends in part on properly con­
ceptualizing the decline and on properly specifying its causes. Neither 
facet of the issue is (nor is likely to become) free of enduring controversy.
31. For a brief introduction, see Valelly (1990).
32. The theoretical framework for this proposition is laid out in Peterson (1981).
Even more controversial are evaluations of whether turnout decline 
makes or has made any real difference for the representation of public 
policy preferences, and thus for who gets what from government.
Even if one concludes that turnout decline can partly be reversed 
through choices that are plausible and possible in the contemporary 
political context, it turns out that simply returning to the status quo as 
of about i960 will probably require at a minimum an ambitious mix of 
strategies: reform of campaign finance, reform of print and broadcast 
media coverage of the electoral process, and changes in procedures for 
voter registration. Even so, historically deep-seated features of how par­
ties compete with each other and how they mobilize (and fail vigorously 
to mobilize) voters would inhibit the full potential effect of this mix of 
reforms.
Still, agency-based registration (the “motor voter” bill), a key accom­
plishment of the 103d Congress, is an important step. Voters register to 
vote when they are also interacting with a state agency, such as a motor 
vehicle registration board. Under this reform states are also provided 
with resources for using an unbiased procedure for regularly cleaning 
their voter lists. Agency-based registration lowers the costs of voter reg­
istration to an individual radically by “folding” them—as Teixeira has 
pointed out—into another set of costs, like those of, say, registering a 
car. The potential effect on turnout is estimated between 4 and 10 per­
centage points.^'*
Little attention seems to have been paid, though, to the need to alert 
citizens—as they interact with an agency—as to why motor voter regis­
tration seems easier. There is a role here for a public information cam­
paign. Such a campaign could reinforce the norm of citizen duty that 
seems clearly important in motivating a decision to vote at all.
A narrow microeconomic approach to voting would lead any voter to 
conclude that the ratio of costs of voting—time involved in registering 
and voting, for instance—far outweigh the real benefit to the individual 
of voting. The decision to vote depends, in other words, on political 
norms. And, having decided to vote, an average voter is unlikely to vote 
on narrow pocketbook grounds. Such voting is less frequent than voting 
based on broad retrospective or prospective evaluations of the perfor­
mance of politicians (“have they, or has he or she, made America or the 
state or the district better or worse off?”). Yet the role of political norms
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in the decision to vote—and perhaps in the act of voting—has become 
attenuated. Policy design can play a key role in replenishing the force of 
norms in voting; it can lay the “seed corn” of associationalism in its 
broadest sense.^^
The National Election Study used to ask survey questions that sought 
to tap citizens’ sense of obligation to participate in spite of factors that 
made it seem hard or unpleasant. Because so little change seemed to 
occur, most of the survey items were dropped after 1980, but the one 
that was retained—whether one ought to vote even if one did not care 
much about an election—showed a very substantial drop of 17 points 
(59 to 4z) between 1980 and 1988. The Washington Post has asked 
citizens whether they thought that their vote mattered. In 1980 its survey 
found that 91 percent responded yes, but by 1991 that number dropped 
to only 73 percent.^*
Under these circumstances, agency-based voter registration may not 
play as effective a role as it could without an effort to address the decline 
in a sense of citizen duty. When citizens register to vote while doing 
something else at an agency, they can be provided with a brief analysis 
of what many political scientists refer to as the “turnout problem.”
Providing information will cause controversy, and formulating its con­
tent may (perhaps ought) to require a special federal commission that 
incorporates the advice and input of the fifty secretaries of state, as well 
as expert advice on what is known about the consequences and effec­
tiveness of public information campaigns. This is a policy tool whose use 
inevitably raises broad questions about how to safeguard against govern­
ment manipulation of citizens.
But an information campaign might include coverage of the change in 
turnout since i960, a brief international comparison of turnout in the 
United States and in other countries (a feature that will inevitably arouse 
concern since turnout is much lower in the United States than elsewhere) 
and further analysis showing, though, that the United States differs much 
less from other countries in rate of turnout among registered voters. A 
public information campaign would emphasize the clear evidence that 
once registered, voters tend to vote. Fourth, it could also emphasize what
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35. This proposal seems consistent with Teixeira’s own sense of the unexplored role of 
information in changing citizen motivation: “Though it may be implausible to expect a 
characteristic like party identification (partisanship) to increase much in intensity ... it is 
quite plausible ... to expect levels of information-oriented characteristics to increase . . .” 
(1992, pp. 156-57).
36. Teixeira (1992, pp. 55—56).
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political scientists have tended to find, namely, that turnout does not 
benefit one party or the other. Fifth, an information campaign could 
summarize the arguments that hold that the “turnout problem” is exag­
gerated. Finally, it could suggest further reading, pro, con, or mainly 
informative, and a brief statement of a key rationale for voting, namely, 
that active voters tend to know more about what their government is 
doing than inactive voters or habitual nonvoters.
Thus the design of agency-based voter registration could be altered so 
that it incorporates a particular policy tool, the public information cam­
paign, so as to reinforce or reawaken a sense of citizen duty, as defined 
above. Janet Weiss reports that public information campaigns appealing 
to existing, widely held norms are the most successful.^^ This may be 
because an individual’s awareness of the relatively uncontroversial nature 
of these norms makes it easier for him or her to pass along or to discuss 
with others—family members, coworkers, and friends—the contents of 
a public information campaign. Agency-based registration thus has a 
potential for more fully replenishing—without manipulation and in a 
way that is respectful of citizens—the norms that motivate voting.
Otherwise, agency-based registration may subtly signal to citizens that 
citizenship is mainly a matter of calculating costs and benefits (“If we 
lower the costs to you won’t you please vote?”). If so, this would hardly 
be a way to lay “seed corn” for strengthening democratic politics. 
Through espousing a sensitivity to how policy design affects citizenship, 
one sees that a simple issue of apparent detail—whether to provide in­
formation about the “turnout problem”—raises the question of how to 
maximize the broad, democratic utility of a public policy.
Conclusion
Policies are often evaluated as to whether they get the job done well 
and at what price. But policies and their design can also alter the very 
democratic context within which policymaking and policy evaluation 
take place. Like others in this volume I have argued here for an approach 
to policy analysis that is more sensitive to consciously strengthening 
democracy than most contemporary policy analysis. Through illustration 
I sought to show that policy analysts and policymakers alike can ask 
important questions about and of policy trends and initiatives. Other 
examples would surely occur to a group of legislators or administrators.
37. Chapter 5 in this volume.
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How can an existing trend be redirected in a normatively desirable di­
rection? The discussion of building on the employee involvement move­
ment of the 1980s by encouraging works councils sought to answer this 
question. Does this or that policy have an unappreciated democratic 
value? The discussion of the surprising effect on group representation in 
environmental regulation of the Emergency Community Planning and 
Right-to-Know Act addressed this question. What does a policy proposal 
already on the legislative agenda seem to need in order to meet its in­
tended goal? By exploring the role of a public information campaign in 
agency-based voter registration policy, I sought to answer this question.
Concerns about strengthening both the meaning of democratic citizen­
ship and the continuum of associational life that stretches between simply 
deciding to vote and fairly engaged participation in a citizen’s movement 
or in a group stood behind these questions. Thinking through how to lay 
the “seed corn” of associational norms and political skills can inform, 
indeed articulate, policy analysis and recommendation. Policy design can 
construct citizens as competent to address public problems. It can do so 
by providing for representation in local problem-solving processes. Such 
representation provides for small-scale governance that, in turn, can fos­
ter reconnected citizenship in other areas: other groups and more fre­
quent voting. The problem-solving features of local representation that 
can be encouraged by policy also reinforce a norm of governmental 
competence. Public confidence in the realizability of such a norm is cru­
cial to democracy and its deliberative character. Otherwise, public cyni­
cism can steadily grow. Finally, public policy can reinforce existing norms 
that are crucial for reconnected citizenship, such as the sense of citizen 
duty that can motivate electoral participation.
Even if policy design can in fact attend to the task of laying “seed 
corn,” ought it to? Tocqueville claimed that knowledge of association is, 
as he put it, the “mother of all other forms of knowledge,” a dictum 
implying that strong, mutually respectful, “bottom-up” patterns of dem­
ocratic participation and associationalism help nations to become more 
prosperous and decent.^* His claim for a correlation between such forms 
of participation and national strength makes sense, in fact, out of the 
cases explored here. Real, not ersatz, employee involvement arguably 
makes firms stronger and more competitive, and to the extent that firms 
are stronger, then sectors and the economy as a whole are stronger. 
Participation may well be crucial, also, to environmental problem solv-
38. Tocqueville (1969, p. 517).
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ing. Finally, while the link is less obvious in the case of strengthening the 
norms that motivate voting, stronger links between citizens and the elec­
toral process are crucial for creating basic public respect for political 
approaches to common problems.
Democratic renewal through public policy and other initiatives is, in 
fact, already on our national agenda. The American polity is in the midst 
of a widespread sense of public discontent with politics unrivaled since 
the late nineteenth century. Democratic systems have many internal 
sources of renewal, not least the constant recognition among citizens that 
the norms governing the “market” areas of daily life differ from the 
norms that are sovereign in the “public square.” But the careful design 
of public policy is not often seen as a strategy of renewal. This chapter— 
this volume—urges us to take public policy for democracy more seri­
ously.
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